These friends and colleagues are non neo-classical economists, but with a few notable exceptions they shy away from head-on encounter with the dominant current.
François Chesnais Net Worth
Many of us in the anti-globalisation movement are but too well aware that the forms in which government action took place were in contradiction to its very aims and contributed strongly to the ease with which the neo-liberal campaign against government could be conducted by the very powerful interests fighting for deregulation and privatisation. One of the major effects of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation and the temporary triumph of the ideology and politics of laissez faire has been the jump in the economic and social power stemming from concentration in finance and industry this term refers both to manufacturing and to services. Espaces de noms Article Discussion. Yogesh Tripathi marked it as to-read Aug 18, Discover new books on Goodreads.
Biographie. De à , François Chesnais a assumé les fonctions d'économiste principal auprès de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE). Il a notamment coordonné plusieurs projets de recherche et rédigé différents rapports, comme La technologie et l’économie: relations déterminantes (OCDE, Paris, ).
Francois has a strong motivation and is a focused and determined person.” Malik TALHAOUI-ROUXEL “I've attended Mr. Chesnay's securitisation and defeasance courses at the University of Caen and I've been engrossed in his lectures. Mr. Chesnay has several strengths as lecturer but, in my opinion, his key strength is his approach for teaching ...Title: EdTech Artificial Intelligence
François Chesnais IIRE
Chesnais. Content by this author. The power of financial capital and its links with productive capital (2014) N° 38 The power of financial capital and its links with productive capital. Search. Search. Support us. IIRE Newsletter subscription. Publications. No 68. …
François Chesnais (22 January , Montreal) is a French economist. His first major economic (La contradiction ) was published in in La Vérité, followed in by on the international monetary system after the end of Bretton Woods.
Other Editions 2. All Editions Add a New Edition Combine. Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Finance Capital Today , please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Finance Capital Today. Lists with This Book. Community Reviews. Showing Average rating 3. Rating details. Sort order. Start your review of Finance Capital Today: Corporations and Banks in the Lasting Global Slump.
Jan 18, Michael rated it really liked it. This book aims to explain what the Bank for International Settlements calls "the puzzling disconnect between the financial markets' bouyancy and underlying economic developments globally". These macroeconomic institutions pumped liquidity into the system to keep companies afloat but without addressing the underlying issues in the structure of production creating an excess of hoarded surplus-value which is recycled back into the financial system in the form of, for example, share buy backs as opposed to productive investments to expand accumulation.
The result is the situation attested to even in mainstream economic circles: slow growth, low investment, and skyrocketing nominal values of financial assets. Those financial profits, however, are merely claims on future surplus-value that, when they go unrealized, will cause the house of cards to collapse. Those tendencies are overaccumulation and the falling rate of profit. Chesnais explores specific examples of these policies and their effects on the underlying tendential contradictions of capitalism.
For example, how the globalization of the labor force increases the rate of exploitation thus acting as a counter-tendency to the TRPF. Or, another example, how state interventionism acted to buoy industries whose overcapacity would otherwise have led to a crisis of overproduction like China and its steel industry. Chapter 2 is about the historical growth of financialization starting with the end of ww2 and the US need to turn to the world market to overcome insufficient domestic demand.
Thus the Bretton Woods system was born to ensure exchange rate stability through the dollar peg itself pegged to gold. Chesnais covers the end of the Bretton Woods gold standard as the result of falling US current account surpluses and rising primary account deficits due to vietnam war and Great Society social spending which eroded confidence in the dollars convertibility to gold at the promised rate.
Chesnais then details the explosion of forex trading following the Nixon shock of '71 and the implications of liberalized exchange rates and high interest rates in the US on the sovereign debt crises of the 3rd world and the US's own financial supremacy on the international scene.
Concentration, etc. Chesnais starts by locating the foundations of such a Marxist approach in the claim that all financial capital is "fictitious" claims on future not-yet existing value and that interest is a part of the total surplus value created as profit in the course of real accumulation.
He proceeds to discuss the distinction between traditional banking activities taking on short term deposits to finance long term loans to enterprises and realizing a profit on the interest spread and non-traditional "financial intermediation" type services banks have increasingly engaged in during the period of neoliberalism. For these services banks earn profits in the form of fees and commissions. This section echoed much of what Lapavitsas et al details in another book in the Historical Materialism series.
Chesnais connects these insights into banking practices to the broader theoretical questions of how these financial profits relate to the division of surplus value he treats all property income including fees and commissions as a kind of interest income.
Speculative gains however are, importantly, not subtractions from surplus value as they are zero sum and how they relate to the labor theory of value. Chesnais seems to agree with Lapavitsas that financial profits made on lending to households represents a genuine "secondary exploitation".
He then turns to the impact of interlocking corporate directorates companies whose directors sit on the board of other companies on the formation of a cohesive capitalist class. He concludes, I think rightly given the studies he cites, that such a unified class of capitalist elites speaking with "one voice" has not materialized as a result of the growing tendency toward corporate interlocking, at least in Europe. The chapter finishes with a look at 1 the non-financial operations of financial institutions, such as banks producing and handling the physical commodities which underlie the derivatives they trade in and 2 the financial operations of non-financial institutions, seen in the setting up of financial departments, internal group banks, or holdings companies to earn interest and speculative profits.
The next two chapters are about the internationalization of productive capital. Chapter 5 focuses on the nature of the general international market structure, namely global oligopoly. And chapter 6 narrows in on innovations in corporate management and worker exploitation with an overview of classical theories on capital exports from Lenin, Luxembourg, and Hilferding; followed by a historical perspective on the role of FDI where extractive industries dominated the global scene at the turn of the 20th century but US TNCs controlled manufacturing because of improvements in products and managerial strategy.
Join Goodreads. Combine Editions. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Error rating book. Refresh and try again. Catherine Sauviat ,. These friends and colleagues are non neo-classical economists, but with a few notable exceptions they shy away from head-on encounter with the dominant current.
It may help participants in the Mumbai World Social Forum to challenge people from academia in their home countries. It is presented as my contribution to an important gathering which I unfortunately cannot attend. The note is informed by theoretical considerations backed up by first-hand teaching, research and anti-globalisation activity and experience in Brazil and Argentina.
It sketches some of the main destructive effects of the neo-liberal agenda on the factors underlying and permitting development. The author recognises that some arguments may seem excessively cut and dried, and that many points can and indeed should be qualified. However it seems hard to get the debate off the ground about the macro-institutional and macro-social processes at work internationally which impede and indeed destroy development without stating the case quite sharply.
The author is confident that serious readers will bring evidence from their own countries, notably in Asia, illustrating a number of points as well as presenting qualifications to the arguments wherever necessary. Development leads to or permits growth, which in turn strengthens the material basis of development.
Thus proper living and sanitary conditions for a broad section of the population, which unconsciously but very mistakenly all of us from the advanced parts of the world take for granted, are the outcome of growth mediated by given institutions but also key factors enhancing further development.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of feedback relationships between growth and development, the distinction between the two should be kept. The latter refers to interactive cumulative social processes and endogenous institution building which are not captured in growth indicators.
Debate has been pursued regarding the latter. Is GDP per se a proper indicator of economic growth? By contrast, the debate about the nature and conditions of development has petered out. Only a few people still consider that the debates of the s concerning the conditions leading to endogenous self-sustained growth remain relevant on many points, and that their modernisation should be a part of the work to be undertaken by economists and political scientists as part of a theoretical struggle against neo-liberalism.
The conditions that were stressed included the deconcentration and democratisation of certain forms of property, notably land and finance.
Hence the issue of agrarian reform and the need for sources of finance for investment and for social infrastructures other than that of banks controlled by the financial oligarchy. There was general recognition that the allocation of investment finance should be made according to priorities set out through public debate organised around specific government bodies. The conditions stressed included of course education in a very central way, understood as the improvement, reproduction and expansion of education systems supported by long term financing guaranteed by government today we would say freed from the tyranny of low income and capital taxation and fiscal orthodoxy.
Today modernisation would bear for instance, very strongly, on the organisation of government the state, for those who use Latin languages and its relation to citizenship and the direct involvement of people, workers, peasants, in democratic economic decision making.
Many of us in the anti-globalisation movement are but too well aware that the forms in which government action took place were in contradiction to its very aims and contributed strongly to the ease with which the neo-liberal campaign against government could be conducted by the very powerful interests fighting for deregulation and privatisation. Many of the factors subsequently discussed in the late s and early s in relation to national systems of innovation, with their specific social and political underpinning  , fall under the notion of development.
Network relationships among institutions will help to capture the cumulative dimensions of science, technology and know-how. This will depend on the quality of their co-operation, but also on the stability they enjoy and the horizons they have for expanding their activity. This can often only be provided by government funding of research and development, as well as of education. The definition of national systems of innovation put forward by the Danish-based group at Aalborg stresses that they must seen as:.
The elements of the system of innovation either reinforce each other in promoting processes of learning and innovation or, conversely, combine into constellations blocking such processes The performance of the world economy in the s has been poor. World output growth for — as measured by GDP averaged 2. This in turn is transformed by highly unequal income distribution into strongly falling per capita income, for tens if not for hundreds of millions of people.
Not only did the decade begin and end with financial crisis in countries belonging to what used to be called the Triad in real estate and banking crises in many countries and a major stockmarket, housing and banking crash in Japan, and in the start of the collapse of Nasdaq which spread to Wall Street and triggered off recession in the US in The setting is that of the deregulation and external opening of financial systems in a very short period of time, allowing the entry and ensuring exit for very large amounts of short term financial investment.
Finally the setting is that of the Uruguay Round leading up to the Marrakech treaty one pillar of which is the new, very extended industrial property right protection regime and to the setting up of the World Trade Organisation WTO. In NAFTA this prerogative is extended to corporations — as Canada and Mexico have experienced at their expense. This term is best defined as the international economic and political regime which follows from the adoption by practically all the governments and political elite in the world, of the policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation as well as of the ideology and domestic politics of laissez faire and enrichissez-vous enrich yourself.
It is not simply the intensity of international interdependencies that globalisation has changed but their quality and structure. At some point in the early s it acquired a very central additional dimension, which is that of draining savings, non-invested income and financial liquidity from the whole world towards a small number of countries possessing large, secure and attractive financial markets.
The definition of globalisation — an international economic and political regime stemming from the adoption by governments and elites of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation as well as the ideology and politics of laissez faire and enrichissez-vous — suggests that issues cannot be reduced to the North-South divide, however important this divide is. The dividing lines are also within countries. They always were, but their configuration has changed and after a phase in which they seemed to have softened, at least in some countries, they have considerably hardened again.
The scale of capital flight from their home country by owning classes, notably in Latin America, is one indicator. One of the major effects of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation and the temporary triumph of the ideology and politics of laissez faire has been the jump in the economic and social power stemming from concentration in finance and industry this term refers both to manufacturing and to services.
In the case of Triadic, notably western, countries such power is lodged, individually and through their organisations for collective action, in large industrial groups which deregulation and privatisation have allowed to become ever larger and in financial institutions, notably those which centralise large masses of money on the basis of contemporary mechanisms of savings mutual funds and pension funds in Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan, large insurance companies in continental Europe.
The process, however, is not limited to the countries at the heart of the Triad, even if it is there that the driving forces are to be found. Poor or very poor growth and an ever greater polarisation of wealth began to become subjects of concern to a part of the staff at the World Bank in the second half of the s. Nonetheless the overwhelmingly dominant official reply is still that liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation represent the best course, and that problems stem from these policies not being pursued robustly enough.
This note will argue that these policies lie on the contrary at the heart of the difficulties faced by many parts of the world, including advanced capitalist countries. Contemporary trade and direct investment liberalisation can and should be subjected to the characterisation made by Friedrich List in the first half of the 19th century regarding classical international trade theory, namely that the theorems demonstrating gains from trade for all countries are very heavily ideologically biased.
The theory expresses principally the interests of industrial countries which have established a lead in manufacturing and in large service industries. Marx himself gives three reasons. Two are strictly economic: the narrowness of the British home market due to the capitalist pattern of income distribution; and economies of scale associated with steam and the increase in productivity stemming from the organisation of work in the new factories.
The third reason is broader and relates to outward economic expansion through trade as a factor of political and social domination. Once capital accumulation had grown to the point where capital and not only goods had to be exported, this dimension of outward economic expansion continually increased in importance, developing alongside new reasons for the outward drive and helping them to consolidate in the form of structural features of the world economy.
Today cross-border movements of goods and services among the affiliates of TNCs and between these and parent companies account for a third of world trade, another third being trade in which TNCs act as buyers or sellers with their particular trading power UNCTAD, Firms turn their back on their home economies.
For TNCs the overriding motive seems now to be the exploitation of cheap, unprotected labour resources. There are two reasons for this. The first is the dramatic burden of foreign debt and the tremendous pressure placed on countries by creditors and the IMF to earn dollars though exports to make interest payments. The second is related to the skewed pattern emerging from insufficient domestic demand. The local firms which emerge from endogenous processes of financial and economic concentration, do so in the context of domestic economies, where the monetary income purchasing power of large sectors sometimes the majority of the population is low or next to nil.
These firms have also survived the onslaught of competition by advanced country TNCs and so are, on the face of things at least, competitive. To where? To the places where effective monetary demand is concentrated, namely to the advanced economies, starting with the US. The very term used to designate these countries was changed. Previously they were called NICs. This gave them the time to undertake the long and complex process of technological accumulation.
This is true of Japan also. Even under the US military government of General Douglas McArthur after , no attempt was made to oblige Japan to forgo sovereignty over its home market and to let foreign goods and capital pour in and destroy its manufacturing industry. The newly industrialised countries NICs which began their technological accumulation in the s have been treated very differently.
Time has been denied to them. From the start of the s onwards the major powers used their privileged position in the major international forums — the IMF and the WTO in particular — as well as the powerful leverage of foreign debt, and bilateral arm twisting whenever necessary, to bring an end to the experience of internationally interdependent but autonomous industrialisation and technological accumulation in the NICs. Processes which are by definition long and difficult, and which require time, have been cut short by external decree.
The speed of trade and direct investment liberalisation of the late s and the s has been dictated by the agenda of the advanced countries at the centre of the system. Very few countries have been allowed to negotiate the speed at which they considered their economies should be opened up to the full blast of international competition — Korea when it joined the OECD and up to the crisis, China in joining the WTO, India, but to my knowledge no Latin American country once the Washington consensus had been decreed, let alone an African one.
In manufacturing, the outcome of trade and direct investment liberalisation has been the bankruptcy of domestic industry, followed in the best of cases by change of ownership and restructuring following foreign acquisition and merger. An appearance of local manufacturing capacity subsists, but a great number of domestic firms are now affiliates of foreign TNCs. In this capacity they are relegated to commercial or assembly plant arm functions for the national market or being a piece or rather a tiny cog in a TNC-dominated international subcontracting arrangement.
The process has hit both export-led growth model economies and countries which had attempted from the s onwards growth through import substitution. The difference has been in the timing.
Up to the second half of the s it seemed that TNCs would only succeed in imposing their agenda for liberalisation and privatisation on countries experiencing the specific vulnerabilities of the import substitution growth model.
They commanded a large part of manufacturing, and determined the nature and level of the technology in use in the industries which they ran. After all, these were inherent to their coming to invest in protected markets with little or no competition.
François Chesnais Archives - ContrahegemoniaWeb
Entrevista con François Chesnais: “La salida de la crisis, es decir, una nueva fase prolongada de acumulación de capital, no es posible”. Para François Chesnais 1/, el capitalismo, inmerso en sus contradicciones internas y también abocado a la crisis ecológica que genera, choca hoy con “límites infranqueables”.
Biography. Francois Chesnais obtained his master’s degree in Biotechnology from the University of Lille 1 (France). He started his PhD in the Veschini lab in October and his current research focuses on blood vessel formation and maturation using stem cell technology and custom Lab-on-a-chip devices. François Chesnais is Emeritus Professor at the University of Paris-Nord (Villetaneuse) and of the Scientific Council of Attac France. 1. This is the case for the critique made by Stiglitz of IMF and World Bank policies, and of the ways in which they are influenced by the close of these institutions with private financial interests. J. Francois has a strong motivation and is a focused and determined person.” Malik TALHAOUI-ROUXEL “I've attended Mr. Chesnay's securitisation and defeasance courses at the University of Caen and I've been engrossed in his lectures. Mr. Chesnay has several strengths as lecturer but, in my opinion, his key strength is his approach for teaching Title: EdTech Artificial Intelligence.
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